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Abstract
We propose an identied structural GARCH model to disentangle the dynamics of
nancial market crises. We distinguish between the hypersensitivity of a domestic market
in crisis to news from foreign non-crisis markets, and the contagion imported to a tranquil
domestic market from foreign crises. The model also enables us to connect unobserved
structural shocks with their source markets using variance decompositions and to compare
the size and dynamics of impulses during crises periods with tranquil period impulses. To
illustrate, we apply the method to data from the 1997-1998 Asian nancial crisis which
consists of a complicated set of interacting crises. We nd signicant hypersensitivity
and contagion between these markets but also show that links may strengthen or weaken.
Impulse response functions for an equally weighted equity portfolio show the increasing
dominance of Korean and Hong Kong shocks during the crises and covariance responses
demonstrate multiple layers of contagion e¤ects.
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An important unanswered question concerning nancial crises is whether it is possible
to separately identify and measure shocks emerging from a particular source market.
As well as disrupting markets in the country where trouble begins, nancial crises may
spread turmoil into foreign markets in a phenomenon often labelled contagion.1 Here we
develop a method for separating these increased crisis-period linkages into two categories.
The rst category is hypersensitivity to information from elsewhere during a local crisis,
in other words, where turmoil at home changes the way a domestic market reacts to
news from foreign markets. The second category is changes to the impact of news from a
troubled foreign market on (potentially non-crisis) domestic markets - we restrict the label
contagionto this second e¤ect. These categories can be separately measured whenever
domestic and foreign crises are not totally coincident.2
This distinction is not an unnecessary abstraction since each category supports dif-
ferent crisis management and prevention policies. While the domestic policy makers of
a country in crisis are likely to be interested in preventing increasing hypersensitivity,
that is, preventing their own troubled market from over-reacting to external news, they
have little incentive to prevent their crisis spreading to foreign markets. On the other
hand, such a crisis may generate externalities to other countries in the form of contagion
so that governments and market participants in non-crisis countries may want to protect
their markets from foreign-sourced trouble, if possible. The existence of these externali-
ties is consistent with the agenda for coordinated global reforms in regulation, nancial
infrastructure and instrument design following major incidents.
Here we model contemporaneous linkages between nancial markets during normal
times, as well as changes during crisis periods. In order to capture the well-known clus-
tering of nancial returns, we base our analysis in a multivariate GARCH model of asset
1Consistent with recent literature, we here refer to purecontagion in the terminology of Dornbusch
et al. (2000) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (2002), as distinct from crisis-driven changes in fundamental
linkages.
2Theoretical models of contagion propose mechanisms such as information asymmetry and portfolio
rebalancing (Kodres and Pritsker, 2002; Yuan, 2005), institutional and regulatory linkages, and rela-
tionship complexity (Allen and Gale, 2000; Brusco and Catiglionesi, 2007; Pavlova and Rigobon, 2007).
Recent network theory tallies particularly well with the empirical framework developed here, see Allen
and Babus, (2008).
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market interaction. However we do not simply work with the standard spillovers from
a reduced form MGARCH, instead, we model contemporaneous structural interactions
between concurrently trading markets using an extension to the work of Caporale et al.
(2005) and Rigobon and Sack (2004) on identication via heteroskedasticity. Within the
framework we allow di¤erent regimes, corresponding to periods of tranquility and to a
series of crises experienced during the sample period. One advantage of our structural
GARCH approach is that the model identies the underlying independent shocks which
are key to sourcing transmissions between asset markets.
We also implement an innovative approach to classifying and interpreting structural
shocks by attributing them to a specic source market using variance decompositions.
Unlike previous approaches, this method is data-driven and does not rely on arbitrary
restrictions such as market hierarchies, orthogonalizations or chronology. Once we have
matched structural shocks to their market of origin, it becomes possible to track the
size and duration of innovations from any particular source and compare their relative
importance under di¤erent regimes (that is in the di¤erent crises or tranquil periods). The
rich interactions captured in our model contribute to the developing empirical literature
on cross-country and cross-asset-market crisis models. In addition, our technique can
be applied to other crises where the source of trouble is unclear, enabling observers to
distinguish the real underlying drivers of contagion from simple crisis chronology.
Data from the Asian crisis of 1997-1998 o¤ers a tangle of interrelated information
ows between regional markets; we can untangle key elements of crisis transmission using
our structural model. Taking the perspective of an international investor, we model daily
U.S. dollar returns to major equity market indices during the crises in Asia over the
period 1997-1998. The sample consists of Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea and Thailand,
each of which had their own crises and potentially also received transmissions from other
crisis countries. The results show statistically signicant contagion between a number
of countries and some evidence for hypersensitivity. Not all signicant crisis changes
were associated with increases in market integration; several linkages weakened. Our
ndings are consistent with the hypothesis that in many cases the crisis country had
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weak incentives to slow down the spread of turbulence to neighbors, while nearby markets
under the threat of contagion had more cause to take a proactive role in curbing the crisis
of an a¤ected neighbor, or once a crisis has developed, to look for protection either via
domestic regulation or international policy coordination.
Further analysis using innovation accounting for an equally-weighted portfolio of eq-
uity indices shows the rise in importance of Korean and Hong Kong-sourced shocks as
transmitters of contagion in the region, a reaction made more marked by the Hong Kong
markets hypersensitivity to news from Indonesia during October 1997. The cross market
e¤ects revealed by impulse responses on covariances between assets show how the covari-
ances between non crisis countries can be a¤ected by the events unfolding elsewhere.
The paper begins with a brief review of the modelling of contagion, the di¢ culties
this presents for policy makers in using the results, and how this motivates the current
paper. In Section 3 we set out the modelling strategy and Section 4 explains the dynamic
analysis. The Asian data and estimation results are reported in Sections 5 and 6. Section
7 concludes.
2. Motivation
Crisis-driven changes in the transmission of asset market shocks are often labelled
contagion. Theoretical models of contagion have emphasized the role of information ow,
(Akhigbe and Madura, 2001), portfolio rebalancing (Kodres and Pritzker, 2002) and
institutional linkages (Allen and Gale, 2000). Most recently, the linkages created through
networks in international banking have come to attention as a means of transmitting
crises through nancial institutions; for an overview see Allen and Babus (2008).
Empirical contagion models aim to measure these changes in the relationships between
asset markets. For example Rigobon (2001) emphasizes increased correlations. This may
come through increased strength of existing linkages, as in Eglo¤ et al. (2007) who inves-
tigate microstructural channels when looking at credit risk transmission, or via changes
in the parameters connecting assets, such as Yang et al. (2009). Alternatively, contagion
may be viewed as the opening of new channels of transmission during crisis, see Dungey
and Martin (2007). Other authors emphasize nonlinearities and use threshold models
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to separate tranquil and crisis periods; such as Bae et al. (2003) and Billio and Peliz-
zon (2005) or more recently the potential for a domino e¤ect of crises in Markwat et al.
(2009). An acknowledged aspect of each of these approaches is the need to rst control
for general conditions, such as in Giesecke and Weber (2004) who control for common
e¤ects in credit default contagion, Dungey and Martin (2007) who use a common factor
approach and Eglo¤ et al. (2007) who di¤erentiate macrostructural channels.
Crisis prevention and mitigation is a key goal of nancial regulators. Suggestions for
mitigating or preventing crises include Diamond and Dybvig (1983), who argue for deposit
insurance to stop runs, and Castiglionesi (2007), who argues that central banks can use
reserve requirements to compensate for the incomplete contracts which allow contagion
to exist.3 Network theory proposes optimal degrees of connectedness between nancial
institutions, where both the number of connections and the form of those connections -
whether to the centre or periphery institutions - matters. (See Allen and Gale (2000) for
the seminal contribution but also Frexias et al. (2000), Hasman and Samartin (2008),
and for empirical evidence, Furne (2003).)
Knowing how to respond to a crisis depends on more than simply knowing that
contagion exists, or measuring the size of these e¤ects, although these are undoubtedly
important aspects. To formulate an appropriate crisis response it is also critical to be able
to trace the source of the crisis. For example, the Bank of England, viewing constraints on
the economy as emerging from the banking sector, provided nancial support to improve
banks balance sheets in order to tackle reduced credit to businesses and households.
Thus far, the empirical literature on nancial contagion has not addressed this issue, but
simply identies changes in the relationship between markets.
Here we provide a method for identifying both the existence of contagion between mar-
kets, and to identify the direction of transmission. We distinguish between contagion,
which is the impact of a crisis in one market on another non-crisis market, and hyper-
sensitivity, which is the increased sensitivity a market in crisis experiences to externally
generated shocks. The distinction between contagion and hypersensitivity is important
3Note that the Castiglionesi (2007) model has an acknowledged moral hazard problem.
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for policy making. If a market is in crisis, it is most likely that domestic policy makers
are more concerned about hypersensitivity than contagion - that is they are concerned
about the increased reaction of the domestic economy to foreign shocks during this time,
and less concerned about the e¤ects of their own crisis on others. On the other hand,
foreign countries who are not experiencing a crisis are concerned mainly about limiting
the spread of the crisis and hence about the e¤ects of contagion. This highlights an
important tension in forming international agreements on crisis management - the incen-
tives of the crisis and non-crisis countries are quite di¤erent. In the Asian nancial crisis
of 1997-1998, for example, the actions of Malaysia in limiting capital ows from the end
of August 1998 is a good example of a country concerned with limiting hypersensitivity,
while the IMF programs of the time can be portrayed as attempts to limit contagion to
developed markets. In this paper we look to the empirical separation of these e¤ects.
3. Modelling strategy
Consider a vector of k ltered asset returns Yt;which are all potentially contempora-
neously interlinked in tranquil periods, so that the system can be described as
BYt = ut (1)
where B is a kk matrix of coe¢ cients representing these non-crisis linkages, bij, normal-
ized on the diagonal elements of B: The lter removes non-zero means, auto-correlation,
spillovers, and contemporaneous common factors. A typical choice of lter is a VAR(1) in
returns with the US short term interest rate as an exogenous variable representing global
nancial conditions; see Forbes and Rigobon (2002). The k  1 vector ut represents the
idiosyncratic shocks in the system,
ut = gt"t (2)
"it  iidN(0; 1) (3)
where gt is a k  k diagonal matrix. (Scaled structural innovations ut are uncorrelated.)
The underlying shocks themselves, given by k1 vector "t; are distributed i:i:d: standard
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normal: Appendix A gives a detailed k = 2 dimensional example of the model and
dynamics.
Here, we capture hypersensitivity and contagion as a change in the strength of linkages
between asset returns during a crisis consistent with the approach of Forbes and Rigobon
(2002), Favero and Giavazzi (2002), and Pesaran and Pick (2007) amongst others.4 (These
additional parameters can also detect nonlinearities in the mean equations associated with
the crises.) We explicitly model both the ability of countries to transmit contagion abroad
and any super-sensitivity to foreign shocks during periods of domestic crisis. In the past,
these two e¤ects have not been separately distinguished nor empirically quantied, both
being captured in a single measure. We model tranquil and crisis periods as follows:
(B+BcDt +DtBs)Yt = B
Yt = ut; (4)
with BcDt and DtBs representing the linkages present in crisis periods. Contagion
(indicated by subscript c) is modelled as the additional impact on the asset market in
home country i during a crisis in foreign country j, given by the parameters bc;ij (bc;ii = 0)
in each equation, the elements of the k  k matrix Bc. Hypersensitivity (indicated by
subscript s), is given by the parameter bs;ij in each equation (elements of the k  k
matrix Bs) measuring the additional impact of foreign shocks during a domestic crisis.
Each period of crisis is identied using an indicator variable Di;t which is one during
the crisis in home country i and zero otherwise, elements of the k  k diagonal matrix
Dt. The relevance of each instance of contagion and hypersensitivity is tested by the
signicance of the parameters bc;ij and bs;ij respectively: In the case of no contagion or
hypersensitivity in the system bc;ij = bs;ij = 0 for all i; j:
4Choice of crisis periods is described in section 5 below.
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The detailed structure of equation (4) is
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bs;ijDityjt + uit: (6)
We also model the known volatility clustering of nancial markets returns inYt: Given
the structure of (2) to (4) it is straightforward to see that
BYt  (0; E[Gt]); (7)
where Gt = gt"t"0tg
0
t is a k  k diagonal matrix of the squares of the elements of the
matrix gt.
The conditional covariance matrix of the structural shocks is a GARCH(1,1), specied
for Gt as
Gt = diag[ +  (ut 1  ut 1)] + Gt 1; (8)
where is a k1 vector of constants,  i,  is a kk diagonal matrix of ARCH coe¢ cients
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and  is a k  k diagonal matrix of GARCH coe¢ cients. So for each country i
g2ii;t =  i + iiu
2
i;t 1 +  iig
2
ii;t 1: (9)
Since both Gt 1 and ut 1 are unobservable, we specify the system as a reduced form,
Yt= t; where t := (B)
 1ut = Aut: (10)
The joint conditional distribution of the vector of ltered returns is
Yt  N(0;Ht); (11)
and we work with this reduced form covariance matrix, Ht; which can be estimated as a
multivariate GARCH process in the ltered returns vector Yt, Ht = AGtA0:
Identication of the structural parameters in B from the estimated value of Ht de-
pends on establishing the link between the structural parameters and the reduced form.
The lower diagonal elements of the reduced form covariance matrix Ht can be expressed
as 5
vech (Ht) = C0 +C1 (t 1  t 1) +C2ht 1 (12)
where C0 is a k(k+1)=2 1 vector of constant coe¢ cients, C1 is a k(k+1)=2k matrix
of ARCH coe¢ cients , C2 is a k(k + 1)=2 k matrix of GARCH coe¢ cients and ht is a
k  1 vector of the diagonal elements of Ht.
To establish the relationship between the coe¢ cients ofHt and the structural parame-
ters we begin with the vector of ARCH terms. Relying on the independence of structural
shocks, we set cross products to zero and write
(A A) 1 t 1  t 1 = (ut 1  ut 1) : (13)
5In the case of non-zero mean data the following expressions would be complicated by the additional
interactions of any common factors with the independent factors.
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Next we can make a similar transformation of the GARCH terms:
(A A) 1 ht 1 = vecd (Gt 1) ; (14)
where vecd is the vector of the diagonal elements of the matrix.
If we again rewrite Ht = AGtA0 in vech () form and dene the required transforma-
tion of the A matrix as Av, a k(k + 1)=2  k matrix of products of the elements of A;
then the reduced form covariance matrix is comprised of structural shocks and structural
parameters,
vech (Ht) = A
v +Av (ut 1  ut 1) +Avvecd (Gt 1) : (15)
Finally by substituting equation (13) and equation (14) we can link the C matrices of
the reduced-form MGARCH and the structural parameters,
vech (Ht) = A
v +Av (A A) 1 (t 1  t 1) +Av (A A) 1 ht 1: (16)
Estimation and identication of structural form parameters therefore depends on the
estimation of the reduced form covariance matrix expressed in terms of structural pa-
rameters. The coe¢ cients from the reduced form in equation (12) provide k(k + 1)=2
parameters in the C0 matrix, k2(k + 1)=2 parameters in each of the C1 and C2 matrices
for a total of (2k + 1)(k + 1)k=2. The structural model contains 3k(k  1) parameters in
the B matrix and 3k GARCH parameters for a total of 3k2: (In the four-country exam-
ple estimated below there are 48 structural parameters and 90 reduced form parameters,
unlike a conventional identication problem where the number of structural parameters
typically exceeds the number of reduced form moment conditions.)
The MGARCH structure of the model provides us with additional scores (rst order
conditions) that overcome problems of identication and endogeneity. Overcoming the
endogeneity problem of this simultaneous model is possible due to the fact that we do
not directly estimate the contemporaneous structural model but indirectly estimate struc-
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tural parameters as part of the time-varying reduced form covariance matrix. There is no
endogeneity problem in the estimation of the reduced form covariance matrix. Structural
parameters are non-linear transformations of the reduced form parameters in this model,
and although an analytical proof of identication is di¢ cult, we have evidence for local
numerical identication since we consistently achieve convergence in the maximization
of the structural likelihood function from a range of starting values.6 Numerical iden-
tication of the structural parameters is helped by low correlation between the ltered
returns series. We also conrm the numerical identication and optimization procedure
by estimating the model from simulated data.
4. Dynamics
Innovation accounting within the SGARCH model gives a mapping of the dynamics
of transmissions between markets. We introduce a new approach to connecting each
structural shock to a source market without resorting to standard identifying restrictions
such as Choleski decomposition or long-run variance assumptions. Our method relies on
an interpretation of variance decomposition: we treat the shocks which contribute the
largest part of each domestic-market forecast error variance during the tranquil period
as emanating from that market. This interpretation is possible because we estimate the
entire (normalized) structural model and can thus work with the structural innovations
directly, rather than their reduced form counterparts. Consequently we do not need to
apply arbitrary restrictions to the structural model to trace turbulence during crises back
to a specic source.
We make tranquil period dynamics the benchmark then examine the dynamics of both
contagion and hypersensitivity e¤ects during periods of crisis. We take the position of an
international investor holding an equally weighted USD portfolio of each of the market
indices in the model, and track the impact of structural impulses on the volatility of this
naive portfolio. While this is a convenient application of the processes and e¤ects, the
6Rothenberg (1971, Theorem 7) shows that for non-linear systems of equations, under weak regularity
conditions, an overly strong su¢ ciency condition for global identication of structural parameters is
met when the Jacobian matrix of partial derivatives with respect to the structural parameters has a
positive determinant and the sum of the Jacobian and its transpose is positive semidenite.
12
potential for exploring contagion dynamics in this model are much wider than this simple
portfolio example. The model can be used to track individual transmission paths for
shocks from all domestic and foreign sources under each of the four crises in the sample,
separating hypersensitivity and contagion e¤ects.7
The 1 step ahead conditional forecast error variance for Yt is the tted value of the
reduced form conditional covariance matrix:
vart [Yt+1   Et (Yt+1)] = vart [Aut+1   Et (Aut+1)]
= Ht+1jt; (17)
treating all estimated parameter values as known with certainty.
The conditionally heteroskedastic properties of the model mean that forecast errors
vary with realized volatility at time t, and consequently each forecast error depends on the
specic history of volatility at time t and more generally on the forecast horizon (Gallant
et al. 1993 and Engle and Ng 1993). Since this process generates almost as many forecast
errors at the 1-step horizon as there are observations in the sample, we need a way of
summarizing the information without losing the value of conditioning. Here we compute
the forecast errors for both tranquil and crisis periods for each time t, and stack them by
size, creating an empirical distribution of conditional forecast error variances, e¤ectively
based on a series of random draws from the structural error distributions. We then select
empirical quantiles from the tranquil and crisis period distributions and compare the
forecast error variances and decompositions.
The forecast error variance is a non-linear function of structural parameters and
structural shocks, however the identication of structural parameters during estimation
means that it is possible to numerically identify the structural errors via the relationship
BYt = gt"t so that g 1t B
Yt = "t: The percentage of the forecast error variance at time
7One could ask, for example, What is the e¤ect on the volatility path of returns to the Thai stock
market of a shock emerging from Hong Kong, during the Indonesian market crisis?, and derive an
impulse response function to estimate the size and duration of this specic e¤ect.
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where gj;t+1jt is the jth column of the 1 period ahead forecast standard deviation matrix
gt+1jt: Each of the structural shocks "j is linked to the ith market if
V Di;jjt > VDi;mjt for m = 1; :::; k;m 6= i:8 (19)
Further, in the event that an investor holds an equally-weighted portfolio across the
k markets, the forecast error variance decomposition for the portfolio indicates the shift
in portfolio risk associated with exposure to a particular market during a crisis. The












where w is a k  1 vector of portfolio weights, in our example, 1=k. Using (20) we can
compare the mean contribution of each shock to portfolio variance during the tranquil
and crisis periods.
Conditional impulse responses for the variance of the individual returns can be com-
puted using the approach of Lin (1997). For the equally-weighted portfolio the response















The conditional impulse response of individual components (ij) of the portfolio co-
variance matrix is computed as
8This ordering would not be complete or unique if there were more than one market to which the
shock "j contributed the majority of forecast error variance or if any two structural shocks accounted

















Using the same method as for the variance decompositions, we compute an impulse
response conditioning on each time t volatility history, stack each time path into an
empirical distribution and draw out specic quantiles for comparison.
5. The Asian crisis
During 1997-1998 there were multiple crises in a number of countries in Asia across
several di¤erent classes of assets. The debate over the causes of, and links between, these
crises remains unresolved.
The discursive literature at the time of the Asian crisis viewed pressure in the Hong
Kong equity market around October 1997 as leading to pressure on equity markets in
other countries, and particularly in precipitating crisis in Korean markets. Four of the
major countries involved in the turmoil during 1997-1998 were Thailand, Indonesia, Korea
and Hong Kong. However empirical evidence on contagion during this period is mixed.
On one hand, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) nd little evidence for contagion in these
equity markets using bivariate correlation tests, and Bekiros and Georgoutsos (2008b)
reach a similar conclusion using an extreme value approach. On the other hand, each
of Baig and Goldfajn (1999), Caporale et al. (2003) and Baur and Schulze (2005) nd
statistically signicant contagion e¤ects. Markwat et al. (2009) use ordered logit models
to identify a domino e¤ect where local crisis evolve into more widespread and severe
events and Candelon et al. (2008), using multivariate synchronization indexes, nd a
sudden increase in bull and bear market synchronization among Asian stock markets in
1997. However the dynamic properties of the SGARCH model set out above allow us to
go further than testing for contagion e¤ects. We can also identify the main sources of
turbulence for each countrys crisis and gauge their relative importance to a diversied
investor.
We construct returns as the residuals from a VAR(1) on the log changes in the daily US
dollar-valued equity market indices for each country, including also the contemporaneous
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3-month US Treasury Bill rate as a proxy for an exogenous common shock, following
Forbes and Rigobon (2002).9 The full sample runs from 2 January 1992 to 9 January
2007. Figure 1 shows the time series of returns.
The model proposed in Section 3 requires an exogenous identication of the indicator
variables, Di for i = 1; :::; k; where k is the total number of equity indices involved so we
collate crisis dates for each individual country from existing sources. We set the Hong
Kong crisis period as 27 October 1997 to 17 November 1997 (Billio and Pelizzon, 2003;
Rigobon, 2003) and the Indonesian crisis period as 1 January 1998 to 27 February 1998
encompassing the period of high volatility in returns associated with political uncertainty
and IMF negotiations. The Korean crisis occurs in the lead up to successful renegotiation
of its debt moratorium with the IMF on 24th December 1997. Clearly (Panel C in Figure
1) the volatility in this market began in late November; we designate the Korean crisis
period from 25 November 1997 to 31 December 1997. The Thai crisis in equity markets
dates from 10 June 1997 to 29 August 1997 (Billio and Pelizzon, 2003; Rigobon, 2003).
The crisis periods are shown as the narrow shaded areas in each of the panels of Figure
1.
Table 1 gives data sources and some descriptive statistics for the returns series. The
rst panel is for the entire sample, showing that ltering does not remove the non-
normality in the data and motivating the use of a structural GARCH model for the
ltered residuals to captured volatility clustering and fat tails. The following four panels
give the crisis periods chronologically, conrming that, in general, the volatility of returns
rises when a market is in crisis.
Our modelling strategy depends on the preservation of higher order dynamics in the
VAR residuals, so we tested the returns series for dependence and nonlinearity before and
after VAR ltering. Following Kyrtsou and Serletis (2006) and Bekiros and Georgoutsos
(2008a), we applied the BDS test (Brock et al. 1996) for time-based dependence (in-
dependent and identically distributed observations), the Tsay (1986) test for quadratic
9Data sources are listed in the notes to Table 1. Before estimation we removed all observations where
any market was not trading. This reduced the number of observations in the sample period from 3951
to 3607.
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serial dependence in means, the Engle (1982) LM test for nonlinearity in the variance,
and the Hinich (1982) bispectrum test for nonlinearity and Gaussianity. All tests reject
the nulls of independence and linearity before and after VAR ltering suggesting that
only linear dependence and the common shock have been removed.10 Table 2 reports sig-
nicance levels (p-values) for the Tsay, Engle and Hinich tests and Table 3 shows results
for the BDS (Brock et al. 1996).
6. Estimation results
Tables 4 to 6 gives the results of applying the model of Section 3 to the Asian dataset.
We estimate using quasi-maximum likelihood techniques (QML) via numerical methods in
Ox. Figure 2 sets out graphical evidence for model t, showing the standardized residuals
for each market and Table 2 reports p-values for tests for linear and non-linear dependence
and Gaussianity. The model accounts for much of the conditional heteroskedasticity,
skewness and kurtosis of the original ltered series seen in Figure 1, although some non-
normality remains as evidenced by the Hinich test results, and we observe a few large
outliers associated with specic market events.11 Testing failed to nd any signicant
ARCH e¤ects in any of the standardized residuals series. The Tsay and Hinich tests
for linearity in means are not rejected at the 5% level for Hong Kong, Indonesia and
Thailand standardized residuals but the results are somewhat weaker for Korea. Table
3 shows p-values for the BDS test which fail to reject pure randomness for all but the
Indonesian residuals. We view these results with caution given the problems with test size
and interpretation that can arise when applying this test to the residuals of a non-linear
model. (See Brooks and Heravi 1999, and Brooks and Henry 2000.)
10We also tted a multivariate Mackey-Glass model (Kyrtsou and Labys 2006) as an alternative to the
VAR(1) but found no substantial di¤erence to the ltered residuals and so selected the simpler VAR(1)
model. Results for the Mackey-Glass lter are available from the authors on request.
11The large outlier in March 1996 in the Hong Kong series shows the signicant falls in this market
and through the region due to concerns over China. A number of events appear to be linked with the
outliers for the Indonesian returns, including the opening of the market to full foreign ownership in
October 1993, general regional volatility in April 1998, the Bali bombings in October 2002 and political
uncertainty combined with major earthquakes in May 2006. The September 11 attacks show up in the
outlier in the Korean series and a panic over currency regulations in December 2006 creates an outlier
in the Thai series. Model estimation is robust to the removal of these large outliers. We do not report
results separately here but they are available from the authors on request.
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Table 4 shows the tranquil period coe¢ cient estimates. There are signicant linkages
between a number of the equity markets. The reported coe¢ cients show the impact of
returns from the markets in the table row on the corresponding column market return.
Reading down each column, the returns to the Hong Kong index exhibit a signicant
positive relationship with returns in Indonesia, (0:086) and Korea (0:296): Indonesian
returns are also signicantly a¤ected by Hong Kong (0:103) while the Korean returns are
positively related to Indonesias (0:148) but negatively related to Hong Kongs ( 0:125)
during periods of tranquility. The Thai market appears to import a positive impact from
all three neighbors in the tranquil period, but does not inuence the other markets (as
evident in the last row of Table 4).
Hypersensitivity occurs when the connections between domestic markets and foreign
markets change during a domestic crisis period (Table 5). The coe¢ cients in this table
represent the impact due to crises in markets in the column headings but felt via the
returns from (non-crisis) markets in the rows, hence hypersensitivity. Only one linkage
is statistically signicant and positive in Table 5. This represents positive hypersensitivity
of the Hong Kong market to Indonesian returns (0:814) during the Hong Kong crisis.
Two more linkages are signicant and negative. Korean returns covaried negatively with
Indonesian returns during the Korean crisis ( 0:753) and that Hong Kong returns varied
negatively with Korean returns during the Hong Kong crisis, ( 0:751).
The negative coe¢ cients represent an interesting addition to the literature, in that
they suggest that during periods of crisis, links between two markets may move in either
direction. This is consistent with Forbes and Rigobon (2002) who nd a fall in conditional
correlation in many instances, and with the network literature where reduced linkages
during crises are also consistent with lower correlation.
Contagion occurs when a local market is a¤ected by crisis in other countries. Table 6
shows the strength of these e¤ects. In this table contagion e¤ects arise from crises in the
row markets and impact on returns to the (non-crisis) column market. Results show that
Indonesia experienced contagion from Korea during the Korean crises (0:727). During the
Hong Kong crisis (rst row of the table), Korea experienced signicant positive contagion
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e¤ects from Hong Kong (0:665) while Thailand was impacted negatively by Hong Kong
returns ( 0:504):
Table 7 provides the parameter estimates for the GARCH behavior of the underlying
shocks. In each of the cases there is a small positive and signicant constant and signif-
icant ARCH and GARCH e¤ects. The combined ARCH and GARCH parameters sum
close to one in each case.
A likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that all hypersensitivity and contagion dum-
mies are zero yields a test statistic of 78:24  224 which has a p-value close to zero.
In summary we nd evidence for shifts in the relationships between the equity mar-
kets of Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea and Thailand during the crisis period, but these
e¤ects are not uniform in direction or signicance across countries and crises. In terms
of strengthening e¤ects, the Hong Kong crisis had a large impact on regional markets,
generating signicant contagion in Korea but creating a weakening link with Thailand,
where correlation fell (Table 6). During the Hong Kong crisis in October 1997, the Hong
Kong market also became less sensitive to news from Korea but more sensitive to news
from Indonesia (Table 5). Combining the results reported in Tables 5 and 6, it is appar-
ent that the Korean crisis later that year transmitted additional turbulence to Indonesia,
but at the same time returns from Indonesia became signicantly less inuential for the
Korean market, possibly suggesting that the domestic turmoil both created trouble for
the neighboring market and drowned out feedback from outside. We observe this same
e¤ect in relation to Hong Kong and Korea. During the Hong Kong crisis Korea receives
signicant positive contagion (0:665) but Korean returns are dampened into Hong Kong
( 1:981 in Table 5). By way of contrast, the signs on the contagion and hypersensitiv-
ity parameters connecting Hong Kong and Indonesia indicate an amplication in both
directions: the Hong Kong crisis had signicant positive contagion e¤ects on Indonesia
(0:103 in Table 6) but returns in Indonesia also had a signicant positive hypersensitivity
e¤ect on Hong Kong during the Hong Kong crisis (0:814 in Table 5). The linkages be-




The rst panel of Table 8 gives the tranquil period decomposition at one step ahead,
with 5th and 95th quantile measures.12 We use these results to allocate the shocks to their
source market. In each case, we label the shock that makes the greatest contribution to
volatility in each of the tranquil-period decompositions as the own-country shock.13 The
columns in the table refer to the volatility in each asset (or portfolio), and the rows to the
contributing sources of shock. Own-country shocks contribute at least 80% of forecast
error variance in each case. The maximum impact from another country at the mean is
17% (the link from Korean shocks to the Hong Kong market). The nal column in Table
8 gives the variance decompositions for the equally weighted portfolio which also account
for covariance between the returns. In the tranquil period, Korean and Indonesian shocks
are dominant, at 39% and 31% of the total whereas Hong Kong and Thailand contribute
around 15% each.
The second panel of Table 8 shows the variance decompositions relating to links due to
hypersensitivity during crisis periods.14 There are substantial changes from the tranquil
period. The contribution of domestic shocks is diminished and the impact of Indonesia
increases commensurately. For Hong Kong, Indonesian shocks dominate the local e¤ect,
contributing half the forecast error variance. For the equally-weighted portfolio, results
show an increased contribution of 30 percentage points from Indonesia (60%) and about
5 percentage points more from Hong Kong. The contribution from Korea is reduced,
most likely due to the changing link between Indonesia and Korea.
During an external crisis, contagion links also create dramatic changes. The third
panel of Table 8 shows that the contribution of domestic market shocks to the one-step-
ahead variance decomposition is reduced under foreign crises compared with the tranquil
period for three of the four markets. Change is most dramatic for Indonesia where the
contribution from domestic shocks drops by 57 percentage points to a mean contribution
12The variance decomposition is constructed for all t possible conditionings in the sample. A histogram
of these outcomes gives the mean and quantiles reported in Table 8.
13The results at 5 steps ahead conrm our classication.
14All insignicant parameters are set to zero when variance decompositions and impulse response
functions are computed.
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of 42%; contagion from Korea (46%) and Hong Kong (12%) account for this. The contri-
bution of the domestic shock for Hong Kong falls by about 10 percentage points to 71%
in favour of an increase in Korean contribution to 26%. The contribution of domestic
shocks for Korea decreases by about 17 percentage points, and the inuence of Hong
Kong rises from less than 1% to 15%. There is no real change in the Thai decomposition.
Hence, Hong Kong and Korean shocks are clearly important in all countries apart from
Thailand. This is also evident in the portfolio results, where the contribution of Hong
Kong increases by 7 percentage points to 22% and the Korean contribution increases to
57% due to contagion e¤ects. However, there are falls in the percentage contributions of
Indonesia and Thailand to portfolio variance.
6.2. Impulse response functions
Figure 3 presents impulse responses in the variance of the equally weighted portfolio
to unit (one standard deviation) shocks from Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea and Thailand
respectively. The left column shows the impulse response in the tranquil period, and
the right column shows the responses with contagion e¤ects. Using the unconditional
(sample) portfolio variance as a basis for calculation, a 0.1 increase in portfolio variance
on the vertical axis is approximately equal to a 0.6 percentage point (60 basis point)
increase in annualized portfolio volatility.
A structural shock associated with Hong Kong (Panel A) in the tranquil period is
the smallest of those investigated here, and takes about two months to dissipate half the
initial impact. When we account for contagion, however, the e¤ect of a one standard
deviation shock is to raise variance by a factor of ve over the tranquil period, with
increases persisting above the initial tranquil period impact for well over three months.
Patterns for impulses to structural shocks from Indonesia (Panel B) are remarkably
di¤erent. The initial impact of a one standard deviation shock in the tranquil period
is much larger and the distribution of responses is also more dispersed. By contrast,
contagion e¤ects are small in this case, so that unlike Hong Kong, impulse responses for
shocks from Indonesia in tranquil and contagion periods are alike though the dispersion
is greater during the contagion period.
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The impact of Korean shocks (Panel C) in the tranquil period is greater than for Hong
Kong, but not so large as for the Indonesian case already discussed. During the tranquil
period there are statistically signicant linkages with all the other countries in the sample,
as shown in Table 4. The contagion e¤ects are substantial, with the size of the initial
shock in the external crisis scenario being ve-fold the tranquil period shock. Half of this
impact has dissipated by 45 days after the shock, but some e¤ect is still present nearly
a year after the initial shock. As a result of the lack of linkages from Thailand to other
markets, the impulse responses to shocks originating from Thailand (Panel D) are small
and do not change between the tranquil and contagion periods.
Overall, the largest contributors to volatility are the Hong Kong and Korean crises.
Shocks from these events increase portfolio variance by between around ve times and
persist for a number of months.
Another way to view contagion is via impulse responses on specic covariances. Im-
pulse responses of the equally-weighted portfolio variance average over the whole co-
variance matrix and can inform diversied investors, whereas responses of individual
covariances detail bivariate market links rather than averaging across them, measuring
contagion directly. This technique can also give a breakdown of the way interrelationships
changes during a crisis.
Figure 4 shows impulse responses of four of the six covariances to a one standard devi-
ation shock from the Hong Kong market. The array of di¤erent reactions is illuminating.
Panel A shows the impulse response for the Hong Kong-Indonesia covariance. We see
that the tranquil market link between the Hong Kong and Indonesian markets is weak,
and a shock has a very small impact, whereas the additional contagion period channel
raises covariance responsiveness by a factor of 10 and takes around two months for half
the e¤ect to dissipate. In Panel B, the impulse to the Hong Kong-Korea covariance is ac-
tually negative under normal market conditions, but crisis contagion shifts the covariance
to a strong and persistent positive. By contrast, Panel C sets out the impulse response
to the covariance between Hong Kong and Thailand. Whereas the correlation between
these markets is normally positive and Hong Kong shocks tended to raise the conditional
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covariance, during the crisis the links between Thailand and the rest of the region weak-
ened, and the response of the covariance shifts from positive to negative. Finally, Panel
D shows an example of crisis-driven changes at a secondary level. The Hong Kong shock
is irrelevant to the Indonesia-Korea covariance in tranquil markets but contagion creates
additional transmissions amongst the markets, increasing the covariance from zero to
0.12, even though neither of these markets is the source of the news. The remaining co-
variances (Indonesia-Thailand and Korea-Thailand) were very marginally a¤ected by the
Hong Kong shock, both responding slightly more negatively when a¤ected by contagion.
The impulses of the covariances reveal some of the complexity of the linkages which
occur during crises. Assessing the e¤ects of shocks originating in one country is com-
plicated by both the crisis market transmissions to other markets via contagion and the
potential for changes in the reaction of the crisis market to information from other mar-
kets via hypersensitivity. However, there are also discernible secondary level e¤ects so
that non crisis countries experience increased covariances with each other even though
the e¤ects are not a direct impact of the news from the crisis country. These e¤ects are
realizations of the interrelatedness of the system.
7. Conclusion
We develop a model which contributes a renement to the taxonomy of crises: we
distinguish between hypersensitivity and contagion. A market which is in crisis may
transmit that crisis towards other markets, denoted contagion, and it may simulta-
neously become more or less sensitive to the e¤ects of shocks from non-crisis markets,
denoted hypersensitivity. This distinction has some importance in policy discussions.
A country experiencing a crisis is likely to be concerned primarily with preventing the
impact of hypersensitivity while countries which are not themselves in crisis are more
concerned to prevent the spread of the crisis via contagion e¤ects. Policy design for crisis
prevention and management need to be incentive compatible with the actively operating
links. This suggests that authorities require a substantial degree of discretion to actively
manage crises, as their characteristics vary greatly in terms of the directions and strength
of changes in linkages from tranquil to crisis periods.
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In particular, our results suggest that during the Asian crisis, the crisis countries
themselves had at best weak incentives to slow the spread of turbulence, while the nearby
markets had reason to look for protection either via domestic regulation or through
international policy coordination.
The modelling framework separates hypersensitivity and contagion based on a mul-
tivariate GARCH framework with regimes and exogenously dened crisis periods. An
advantage is that structural parameters can be identied from the reduced form. Unlike
past work, which has relied on arbitrary restrictions to classify the sources of unobserv-
able structural shocks, we use variance decompositions to label the structural shocks and
connect them to source markets. This approach enables an economic interpretation of
risk transmission in tranquil and crisis periods.
Applying this model to four Asian equity markets during the East Asian crisis period
of 1997-1998, we observe statistically signicant contagion links and hypersensitivity. Im-
portantly, these changes are not always positive. The Thai market, for example becomes
more detached from shocks from near neighbors during their crises. Hong Kong trans-
mitted its crisis via contagion e¤ects to both Korea and Thailand, while at the same time
becoming more sensitive to news from Indonesia and less sensitive to news from Korea.
Similarly, during the Korean crisis, Korea transmitted its crisis via contagion to Indonesia
but simultaneously became less sensitive to Indonesian market news. From an investment
perspective, decomposing the portfolio volatility of an equally-weighted portfolio of the
four equity assets identies the redistribution of sources of turbulence away from home
market and towards outside. Impulse response analysis shows the increasing dominance
of Korean and Hong Kong shocks during the crisis, while variance decompositions conrm
this e¤ect and also highlight heightened sensitivity to Indonesian sourced shocks during
crises in other countries. An examination of the cross market linkages revealed the variety
of e¤ects operating during the crisis period.
This new framework and application contribute a breakdown of the directional ef-
fects of the relationship between asset markets during crisis. The model has a number
of similarities with the recent theoretical network literature on linkages between nancial
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institutions, where those institutions care about inow from, and outow to, counter-
parties; see Allen and Babus (2008) for an overview. Future work linking the empirical
framework developed in this paper and network theory should provide insights into the
credit crunch of 2007-2008.
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Appendix A. Two-asset illustration
Here we present a two-dimensional illustration of the main features of the model and
dynamics.
The tranquil period model for VAR-ltered returns for asset markets 1 and 2, denoted
by y1t and y2t; is:
y1t = b12y2t + g11;t"1t (A.1)
y2t = b21y1t + g22;t"2t; (A.2)
which can be extended for crisis periods to
y1t = b12y2t + bs;12D1ty2t + bc;12D2ty2t + g11;t"1t (A.3)
y2t = b21y1t + bs;21D2ty1t + bc;21D1ty1t + g22;t"2t; (A.4)
where the binary dummy variables, D1t and D2t take the value 1 during periods of crisis
experienced in y1t and y2t respectively, and 0 otherwise. Data in the crisis periods provide
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the extra information needed to identify the contagion parameters. For the rest of the ex-
ample, we work with the simpler tranquil period model. The matrix of contemporaneous































so that gii;t"it = uit:
To estimate the simple model structure in (A.1) and (A.2) we need to account for the
covariance between yit and ujt and the identication of structural parameters, and we
resolve both estimation issues by working with the reduced-form covariance matrix.
For two assets, the reduced form covariance matrix vechHt = Avvecd (Gt) from































From (13) above we can write
t 1  t 1 = Aut 1 Aut 1
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using the assumption that the structural shocks are independent so that cross products






































































The proportion of the forecast error variance for return to domestic market one, y1;
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The proportion of portfolio error variance for an equally weighted portfolio includes the
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Figure 1: Time Series of Filtered Daily Returns to Asian Equity Price Indices,
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 1992      1994      1996     1998     2000     2002     2004    2006
 1992      1994      1996     1998     2000     2002     2004    2006
Note: Each series is the residuals from a VAR(1). Grey bars indicate the period designated
as crisis period in each country. Data sources are described in Table 1.
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Figure 2: Standardized residuals from tted SGARCH model,




























D. Thailand standardized residual
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Note: Each series is the structural residual from the tted SGARCH model standardized
by the tted conditional structural standard deviation for the relevant market and time period
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Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions of Equally Weighted Portfolio Variance to
a Standard Deviation Shock for Periods of Tranquility and Contagion
Tranquil Period Contagion
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Note: Vertical axes show the absolute increase in the daily variance of an equally-weighted
portfolio of the equity indices n-days after a one standard deviation structural shock from each
equity market. Impulse response functions are calculated conditioning on volatility at every
time = t in the sample. The dashed lines represent the 5th and 95th quantiles of the empirical
distribution of the conditional impulse responses and the solid line represents the median.
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Figure 4: Impulse Response Functions of Market Covariances to
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Note: Vertical axes show the absolute increase in the daily covariance between selected equity
indices n-days after a one standard deviation structural shock from Hong Kong equity market.
Impulse response functions are calculated conditioning on volatility at every time = t in the
sample. The dashed lines represent the 5th and 95th quantiles of the empirical distribution of
the conditional impulse responses and the solid line represents the median.
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Table 1:
Descriptive Statistics for Equity Returns: Tranquil Period and Crisis Periods
Hong Kong Indonesia Korea Thailand
(HK) (IN) (KO) (TH)
Total Period: 2 January 1992-9 January 2007
Mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Std dev. 1.606 2.456 2.169 1.885
Skew 0.016 -1.436 -0.127 0.168
Kurt 13.354 40.469 12.977 9.500
J-B p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Thai crisis: 10 June 1997 - 29 August 1997
Mean -0.061 -0.642 -0.053 -0.500
Std dev. 1.662 2.487 1.062 3.832
Skew -0.390 -0.857 -0.102 0.079
Kurt 4.942 4.128 2.751 3.190
J-B p-val 0.001 0.007 0.884 0.930
Hong Kong crisis: 27 October 1997 - 17 November 1997
Mean -0.353 -0.168 -0936 -0.450
Std dev. 6.767 5.155 4.936 3.776
Skew 0.700 1.010 0.210 0.271
Kurt 5.046 3.631 2.325 2.204
J-B p-val 0.129 0.226 0.810 0.734
Korean crisis: 25 November 1997 - 31 December 1997
Mean 0.137 -0.723 -1.191 -1.002
Std dev. 2.435 7.671 10.916 2.942
Skew -0.485 -0.331 0.333 0.288
Kurt 2.959 5.737 2.010 2.969
J-B p-val 0.612 0.016 0.477 0.841
Indonesian crisis: 5 January 1998 to 27 February 1998
Mean -0.019 -1.599 0.496 1.166
Std dev. 3.982 11.600 5.193 5.310
Skew 0.496 -0.527 -0.461 -0.034
Kurt 4.360 4.538 2.976 3.4168
J-B p-val 0.112 0.069 0.520 0.872
Note: Returns are computed as percentage log changes in the price indices for Hong Kong
(Hang Seng HNGKNGI), Indonesia (Jakarta Composite JAKCOMP), Korea (Korea
Composite KORCOMP) and Thailand (Bangkok SET BNGKSET) using daily series from
Datastream, translated to US dollars before returns are computed. Sample runs from 2
January 1992 to 9 January 2007 but observations where there is a zero return from any series
are removed before de-meaning, leaving 3607 days. Returns are ltered using a VAR(1) in the




Tests for linearity and Gaussianity in returns, VAR residuals and standardized
SGARCH residuals.
p  values
Tsay (1986) Engle (1982) Hinich (1982)
8 lags 8 lags 210 lattice points
H0 Linarity in mean no ARCH Linearity Gaussianity
Returns, rit
Hong Kong 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Indonesia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Korea 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Thailand 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
VAR residuals, yit
Hong Kong 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Indonesia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Korea 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Thailand 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standardized residuals, "it
Hong Kong 0.544 0.789 0.279 0.002
Indonesia 0.050 0.150 0.939 0.006
Korea 0.020 0.780 0.005 0.000
Thailand 0.654 0.086 0.093 0.000
Note: Table reports p-values for Tsay (1986) test for linearity in means, Engle (1982) test for
ARCH e¤ects, and Hinich (1982) bispectrum test for linearity and Gaussianity, for returns
(log changes in US dollar values of equity price indexes), residuals from VAR(1) ltering of the
returns series including contemporaneous values of the 3 month US T-bill, and the
standardized structural residuals from the SGARCH model tted to the VAR residuals. For
computation of test statistics see Kyrtsou and Serletis (2006).
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Table 3:
BDS tests for departures from randomness in returns, VAR residuals and standardized
SGARCH residuals.
p  values
Returns, rit VAR residuals, yit Standardized residuals, "it
distance; " 0:5  1:5 2 0:5  1:5 2 0:5  1:5 2
Hong Kong
m = 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.583 0.607 0.909 0.494
m = 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.611 0.734 0.958 0.513
m = 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.394 0.495 0.721 0.673
m = 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.266 0.292 0.398 0.959
m = 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.105 0.144 0.212 0.652
Indonesia
m = 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0002 0.006
m = 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.002
m = 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0004 0.005
m = 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.025
m = 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.003 0.003 0.013 0.050
Korea
m = 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.101 0.101 0.106 0.187
m = 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.106 0.109 0.137 0.378
m = 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.128 0.159 0.283 0.712
m = 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.147 0.249 0.401 0.796
m = 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.150 0.383 0.552 0.916
Thailand
m = 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.031 0.135 0.575 0.980
m = 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.131 0.350 0.908 0.599
m = 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.319 0.596 0.981 0.603
m = 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.418 0.664 0.982 0.710
m = 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.251 0.495 0.751 0.952
Note: Table reports p-values for BDS (Brock et al. 1996) tests for pure randomness in returns
(log changes in US dollar values of equity price indexes), residuals from VAR(1) ltering of the
returns series including contemporaneous values of the 3 month US T-bill, and the
standardized structural residuals from the SGARCH model tted to the VAR residuals. The
parameter " sets the benchmark for comparing distances between consecutive pairs of points
in the test sample and the embedding dimension, m, sets the number of pairs in each
comparison set. See Brock et al. (1996) for details.
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Table 4:
Parameter Estimation Results: Tranquil Periods
TO market i (yi)
Hong Kong Indonesia Korea Thailand
(HK) (IN) (KO) (TH)
FROM market j; (yj)
Hong Kong bi;HK 0.103 -0.125 0.263
(0.003) (0.050) (0.000)
Indonesia bi;IN 0.086 0.148 0.152
(0.001) (0.006) (0.000)
Korea bi;KO 0.296 0.009 0.098
(0.000) (0.812) (0.031)
Thailand bi;TH 0.032 0.034 0.024
(0.533) (0.430) (0.642)
Note: Parameter estimates for the model BYt= ut; where (B+BcDt +DtBs)Yt = B
Y with
BcDt +DtBs representing the linkages present in crisis periods. Estimation is by QML over
daily ltered returns to equity market indices, sampling 6 January 1992 to 9 January 2007.
P-values are in brackets.
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Table 5:
Parameter Estimation Results: Hypersensitivity During Crises in market i
TO market i (yi) when Dit = 1
Hong Kong Indonesia Korea Thailand
(HK) (IN) (KO) (TH)
FROM market j; (yj)
Hong Kong bs;i;HK -2.050 -1.981 0.424
(0.191) (0.246) (0.451)
Indonesia bs;i;IN 0.814 -0.753 0.238
(0.000) (0.031) (0.168)
Korea bs;i;KO -0.751 -0.636 -0.687
(0.013) (0.505) (0.415)
Thailand bs;i;TH 0.475 1.346 0.927
(0.234) (0.341) (0.467)
Note: Parameter estimates for the model BYt= ut; where (B+BcDt +DtBs)Yt = B
Y with
BcDt +DtBs representing the linkages present in crisis periods. Each period of crisis is
identied using an indicator variable Di;t which is one during the crisis in home country i and
zero otherwise. Hypersensitivity (indicated by subscript s) is given by the parameter bs;ij in
each equation, operating when Dit = 1; measuring the additional impact of foreign shocks
during a domestic crisis. The relevance of each instance of hypersensitivity is tested by the
signicance of the parameters bs;ij. Estimation is by QML over daily ltered returns to equity
market indices, sampling 6 January 1992 to 9 January 2007. P-values are in brackets.
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Table 6:
Parameter Estimation Results: Contagion During Crises in market j:
TO market i (yi)
Hong Kong Indonesia Korea Thailand
(HK) (IN) (KO) (TH)
FROM market j; (yj) when Djt = 1
Hong Kong bc;i;HK 0.180 0.665 -0.504
(0.263) (0.003) (0.021)
Indonesia bc;i;IN 0.128 0.145 -0.127
(0.266) (0.488) (0.569)
Korea bc;i;KO -0.153 0.727 -0.007
(0.276) (0.001) (0.917)
Thailand bc;i;TH -0.175 -0.051 -0.092
(0.128) (0.654) (0.229)
Note: Parameter estimates for the model BYt= ut; where (B+BcDt +DtBs)Yt = B
Y with
BcDt +DtBs representing the linkages present in crisis periods. Each period of crisis is
identied using an indicator variable Di;t which is one during the crisis in home country i and
zero otherwise. Contagion (indicated by subscript c) is modelled as the additional impact on
asset markets in home country i during a crisis in foreign country j; given by the parameter
bs;ij in each equation, operating when Djt = 1: The relevance of each instance of contagion is
tested by the signicance of the parameters bc;ij. Estimation is by QML over daily ltered






i Hong Kong Indonesia Korea Thailand
Constant  i 0.029 0.070 0.079 0.115
(0.036) (0.020) (0.002) (0.037)
ARCH i 0.089 0.181 0.126 0.171
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
GARCH  i 0.897 0.809 0.859 0.797
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Note: Parameter estimates for the conditional covariance matrix of the structural shocks,
Gt = diag[ +  (ut 1  ut 1)] + Gt 1;where  is a 4 1 vector of constants,  is a 4 4 diagonal
matrix of ARCH coe¢ cients and  is a 4 4 diagonal matrix of GARCH coe¢ cients.
Estimation is by QML over daily ltered returns to equity market indices, sampling 6 January
1992 to 9 January 2007. P-values are in brackets.
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Table 8:
Mean Conditional Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (One Step Ahead)
"i Hong Kong Indonesia Korea Thailand portfolio
Tranquil
Hong Kong 80.38 1.10 0.81 5.04 15.56
[61.89 - 95.19] [0.12-3.42] [0.20-2.39] [1.56-11.82] [4.81-38.40]
Indonesia 3.06 98.74 1.99 5.33 30.88
[0.44-9.16] 96.30-99.83] [0.39-5.53] [0.91-15.27] [10.79-63.63]
Korea 16.59 0.16 97.21 4.76 39.47
[4.06-33.57] [0.03-0.42] [93.06-99.23] [1.20-11.59] [16.11-64.30]
Thailand 0.00 0.00 0.00 84.87 14.09
[0.00-0.00] [0.00-0.00] [0.00-0.00] [69.44-94.98] [4.32-29.80]
Hypersensitivity
Hong Kong 31.26 1.32 1.83 6.25 21.29
[7.71-65.00] [0.15-64.09] [0.42-5.63] [1.85-14.93] [4.72-48.28]
Indonesia 55.99 98.23 32.44 20.56 60.36
[24.38-86.43] [95.10-99.74] [11.17-65.11] [4.72-50.79] [29.49-88.91]
Korea 12.75 0.45 65.73 0.27 4.06
[3.60-26.13] [0.08-1.17] [33.99-87.28] [0.07-0.66] [1.05-9.22]
Thailand 0.00 0.00 0.00 72.91 14.29
[0.00-0.00] [0.00-0.00] [0.00-0.00] [44.37-91.19] [3.50-31.46]
Contagion
Hong Kong 70.91 11.75 15.29 1.19 22.01
[48.07-91.80] [02.79-32.02] [4.75-37.83] [0.35-12.88] [7.80-50.37]
Indonesia 3.28 41.92 3.23 4.06 16.34
[0.51-9.65] [17.21-75.20] [0.68-9.05] [0.67-11.67] [4.44-40.63]
Korea 25.81 46.33 81.49 5.56 57.17
[47.22-47.98] [19.60-71.35] [58.57-93.48] [1.35-13.57] [289.63-79.18]
Thailand 0.00 0.00 0.00 89.19 4.47
[0.00-0.00] [0.00-0.00] [0.00-0.00] [76.38-96.88] [1.30-9.73]
Note: Conditional one-step ahead error variance decompositions, computed for individual
assets and an equally-weighted portfolio of market indices. Rows show the mean of empirical
histogram of the conditional variance decompositions, conditioning on each standard deviation
gii;t in the sample, and gures in square brackets are the 5th and 95th quantiles.
